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Non technical Summary
This paper provides estimates of price-marginal costs ratios, or markup ratios, for 8 Euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Finland) and the US. The markups are estimated for 50 sectors per country over the period 1981-2004 using the EUKLEMS database.
Markup ratios measure the degree of competition in a sector. A markup ratio bigger than 1 implies that prices are larger than marginal costs and are, therefore, evidence of market power in a sector. Thus, estimating the degree of competition in a sector or entire economy is important for regulators, competition authorities and policy-makers. Regulators would like to know whether current regulation is conducive to competition. Likewise, competition authorities might gauge the current competitive situation in a sector. Finally, as mark-up estimates of di¤erent sectors and di¤erent countries allows cross-sector and cross-country comparison of the degree of competition, they should help in identifying which sectors and/or countries would bene…t most from changes in legislation or regulation that a¤ect competition.
The estimated mark-up values in this paper are plausible. From the results, we extract …ve stylized facts. First, perfect competition is widely rejected across most industries and all countries; markup-ratios are generally larger than 1. Second, average markups are heterogenous across countries. Third, markups are heterogeneous across sectors, with services having higher markups on average than manufacturing. Fourth, services sectors have generally higher markups in the Euro area than the US, whereas the pattern is reversed for manufacturing. Fifth, there is no evidence that there is a broad range change in markups from the eighties to the nineties.
Introduction
Markup ratios measure the degree of competition in a sector. A markup ratio bigger than 1 implies that prices are larger than marginal costs and are, therefore, evidence of market power in a sector. Thus, estimating the degree of competition in a sector or entire economy is important for regulators, competition authorities and policy-makers. Regulators would like to know whether current regulation is conducive to competition. Likewise, competition authorities might gauge the current competitive situation in a sector. As mark-up estimates of di¤erent sectors and di¤erent countries allows cross-sector and cross-country comparison of the degree of competition, they should also help in identifying which sectors and/or countries would bene…t most from changes in legislation or regulation that a¤ect competition. Finally, calibrated macro models with imperfectly competitive …rms also need estimates of markups.
The estimated size of the markup ratios in this paper are quite plausible. The average markup ratio in the Euro area is 1.37, in the US it is 1.32. The average, however, masks a great degree of dispersion across sectors. For instance, when only considering manufacturing and construction industries the average markup ratios are 1.18 for the Euro area and 1.28 for the US.
From the estimates a set of stylized facts are extracted. First, perfect competition is rejected for most sectors and all countries; markup-ratios are generally larger than 1. Second, average country markups are heterogeneous. Third, markup-ratios di¤er widely across sectors with some individual sectors having systematically higher markup ratios than other sectors across all countries. Markups are generally higher in services sectors than manufacturing industries. Fourth, services sectors generally have larger markups in the Euro area than in the US, whereas manufacturing sectors generally have lower markups in the Euro area than in the US. Fifth, there is no systematic change in markups from 1981-1992 to 1993-2004. Overall, these stylized facts are not surprising: barriers to entry (either legal or technological ones), product di¤erentiation, exposure to international competition, etc. in ‡uence the degree of competition, causing a di¤erent e¤ect in di¤erent countries and industries. However, it is very di¢ cult to
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January 2008 identify what exactly in ‡uences the degree of competition for each single industry within each country. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two explains the methodology and discusses the related literature; section three presents the data; section four discusses the estimates and derives the stylized facts; and, …nally, section …ve concludes.
Methodology and related literature
Roeger's method
The estimation methodology follows closely Roeger (1995). Roeger's method cleverly uses the two ways to measure the Solow residual: the one in terms of quantities (from pro…t maximization) and the one in terms of prices (from cost minimization).
The Solow residual as derived from pro…t maximization is traditionally de…ned as the di¤erence between output growth and a weighted sum of input growths, where the weights are the input shares in revenue. Under constant returns to scale, perfect competition, and Hicks neutral technological change, this di¤erence is identical to technological change (Solow, 1957) . Hall (1988) shows that under imperfect competition, the Solow residual as traditionally de…ned does not any longer measure technological change but, instead, it measures the weighted sum of technological change and the growth rate of the output-capital ratio. The weights are a function of the markup of price over marginal cost. Thus:
where Q t is output growth, N t is labour input growth, K t is capital input growth, M t is intermediate input growth, t denotes the price-cost markup ratio, and Jt (J = N; K; M ) is the input shares in revenue. The lefthandside is the de…nition of the traditional Solow residual (SR t Q t
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N t N t M t M t (1 N t M t ) K t ). In case the markup ratio is equal to 1, the Solow residual becomes equal to technological change t . 1 Roeger develops the dual equation of the above derived from the pricebased Solow residual equation, i.e. based on the dual problem of cost minimization, constant returns to scale and Hicks neutral technological change. This dual equation, in prices rather than quantities, is:
with p t denoting the output price change, w t the wage change, m t the intermediate input price change, and r t the user cost change. 2 The lefthandside is now de…ned to be the (negative of) price-based Solow residual ( SRP t p t N t w t M t m t (1 N t M t ) r t ). Again, in case the markup ratio is equal to 1, the price-based Solow residual becomes equal to technological growth t .
Roeger observed that by subtracting the traditional Solow residual SR t from the price based Solow residual SRP t technological growth t drops out of the equation. Thus, adding equations (1) and (2) and rearranging, one gets an equation solely in terms of nominal observable variables:
with nominal output growth denoted by p t + Q t (note that (p t Q t ) = p t + Q t ; (w t N t ) = w t + N t ; etc.), nominal wage bill growth denoted by 1 A derivation of this equation can be found in the Appendix. We use the following conventional notation for the rate of change over time: X t = ( @Xt @t =X t ); so that the terms in this equation can be reshu-ed to be equal to equation (9) in Hall (1998) or equation (1) in Roeger (1995) . Note that Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) use a value added concept of output so that only capital and labour enter the equation. We use a gross output concept so that our equation also includes intermediate inputs. 2 We use capital letters for quantities and lowercase for prices.
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January 2008 w t + N t ; growth in intermediate input costs denoted by m t + M t ; and growth in capital costs denoted by r t + K t . In other words, subtracting the price based Solow residual from the quantity based Solow residual one gets a nominal Solow residual. Under the above assumptions of constant returns to scale, imperfect competition and Hicks neutral technological change, this nominal Solow residual is a function of the markup and the di¤erence between nominal output growth and nominal capital cost growth.
For estimation purposes t is assumed constant over time and an error " t is added to the equation. This yields the simple regression:
or
with
. A consistent estimate of can now be obtained by a simple OLS regression of y t on x t : An estimate of the markup is then simply 
:
Hall's method It is useful to recall the alternative method to estimate markups that was developed earlier by Hall (1988) . The method by Hall to estimate markups is based on equation (1) rather than equation (3) . Hall rewrites equation (1) as:
In his seminal paper he does not use data on material inputs and, hence, estimates a version of this equation using a value added based concept of the output rather than gross output, which leads to the following equation: In contrast to the equation by Roeger (1995) this equation can only be estimated using instrumental variables, as technological growth t will generally be correlated with the growth in the labour-capital ratio ( N t K t ). Hall applies the instrumental variables (IV) method on this equation to obtain estimates of t ; using as instruments the petroleum price, the rate of growth of military purchases, and a dummy variable indicating whether the president is a Democrat or a Republican. However, this IV estimation generally leads to very large, sometimes implausible, estimates of the markup ratios. This is related to two problems. The …rst problem is to …nd good instruments; it is di¢ cult to …nd instruments that are correlated with the labour-capital ratio but uncorrelated to technology. The second problem is speci…cally related to the use of value added rather than gross output. Waldmann (1991) argues that the data Hall uses on real value added can not be used reliably to estimate this equation. His argument is that for some sectors, especially for services, there is measurement error in real value added that is correlated with one of the instruments (price of petroleum). This measurement error is induced by the use of a direct-de ‡ation method of constructing real value added; that is, by de ‡ating nominal value added by the output price index. Clearly, the method of Hall itself is fully valid. The problem is in …nding good instruments that are correlated with the labour-capital ratio but uncorrelated to technology and in using value added when measured with considerable error. Note that, for the same reasons, Roeger too refrains from estimating his equation for services sectors, since he also uses value added rather than nominal output.
Measurement error
Roeger develops further where the error term " t in equation (4) comes from. He rightfully argues that if all variables adjust instantaneously and are measured without error, there should be no error term in equation (4) and (and hence the markup) could be calculated (year by year) rather than estimated. He argues in favour of a measurement error in labour input. As this would imply measurement error in y t but not in x t this would just e¤ect e¢ ciency but not consistency. However, it remains the case, as in any econometric exercise, that any measurement error in x t would lead to biased estimates. In our case, bias could arise from any measurement error in nominal output growth or capital cost growth. Regarding nominal output growth, we think that signi…cant measurement error is unlikely. 
The true regression becomes:
where the error
It is now straightforward to show that b; the OLS estimator of ; would be biased.
So that
with Q x = p lim estimate of the markup . Note also that the upward bias is more severe the higher the capital share is.
Returns to scale, sunk costs and other sources of bias The constant returns to scale assumption is crucial to identifying the markup ratio . One can show that under returns to scale , the coe¢ cient (1
3 Thus, in this case, one cannot identify returns to scale separately from the markup: the estimates of 1 1 provide a measure of and not of : When there are increasing returns to scale, markups would be wrongly interpreted to be smaller than they are, while in the case of decreasing returns to scale the opposite would happen.
Regarding sunk costs, these lead to measurement error in capital cost and, therefore, their in ‡uence on the estimated mark-ups should materialize in the same way as any other measurement error in capital cost, in the way described above.
Additional issues that might lead to biases in the estimated markups, such as labour hoarding, overhead labour etc. are discussed in detail by Roeger (1995) and Hall (1988) .
Constancy of the markup-ratio Equation (4) leads to consistent estimates of the markup if the markup is constant over the time period of estimation. Hylleberg and Jorgensen (1998) argue that it is unlikely that the markup remains constant over longer time periods, but that it rather has the form of some constant plus some iid noise. For this case they show that the error term becomes heteroskedastic and autocorrelated and correlated with the regressor. A …rst best in this case would be to use instrumental variables. They argue that it is very di¢ cult to obtain reliable instruments. They instead argue for a constant term in the regression (which corrects for some of the endogeneity under certain conditions (see for detail Hylleberg and Jorgensen (1998)). We do two things to allow for non-constancy. We estimate equation (4) over two subperiods and test for change in the markups. We also test for robustness by regressing (4) with a constant term included and using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors.
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Related literature
The method by Roeger (1995) has been used in a number of related studies to estimate industry markups. Being the …rst, Roeger (1995) uses it to estimate the markups for the manufacturing sector of the US economy on the two digit level for the period 1953-84. Oliveira Martins et al. (1996) uses it to estimate markups in the manufacturing industries for 14 OECD countries over the period 1970-1992 using the STAN database. In the text below we compare our estimates with theirs. Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999) estimate markups in manufacturing industries in the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK. Recently, a small literature has developed that uses the methodology on …rm level data. Konings et al. (1995) 
Data
The data used in this paper is from the EU KLEMS data base (March 2007 Release). The database construction and methodology is described in Timmer et al. (2007) . The database was developed to create measures of economic growth, productivity, employment creation, capital formation and technological change at the sector level for all European Union members and the US from 1970 onwards. The paper uses the data from 1981 to 2004. It contains, with a few exceptions, the necessary input and output data at the detailed sector level (Nace 2 digit, Rev 1.1). For those few sectors in the few countries that do not have data available over the whole period, the estimations are done on shorter periods. The Appendix provides detail. The speci…c variables from the EU KLEMS data base that are used in this paper are the following: gross output (at basic current prices), compensation of employees, intermediate inputs at current purchasers prices, and capital services (volume) indices. The database does not contain a price series for capital. Therefore, to construct r t , a user cost of capital is calculated using the Hall and Jorgensen(1967) 
with P I the investment de ‡ator, i e the real interest rate, and the depreciation rate. For P I we use the …xed capital de ‡ator for the total economy and for i e the real interest rate, both from the AMECO database. The depreciation rate is …xed at 8% throughout.
Results

Markups over the period 1981-2004
Equation (5) The estimated coe¢ cient is an estimate of (1 1 ). So, an estimate of the markup is equal to 1= (1 ) . Table A1 in the Appendix provides detailed markup estimates per sector and country. The corresponding standard errors (reported in Table A2 in the Appendix) are generally small. Hylleberg and Jorgensen (1998) argue that if the markup is not truly constant over the period of estimation one should add a constant term to the regression and correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Roeger also uses heteroskedasticity robust (White) standard errors. As a robustness check we report the markup estimates when a constant term is added to the regression and the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in Tables A6 and A7 . This has very little in ‡uence on the results. The average di¤erence between the markups estimated by OLS and OLS with a constant term in the regression is 0.01. The average di¤erence between the OLS and the robust standard errors is 0.006.
A certain amount of caution is needed in interpreting the estimated markups. As indicated above, the …rst reason for caution is possible deviations from the assumptions of pro…t maximization, constant returns to scale, sunk costs, etc., that would lead to biases in the estimates. A second reason is measurement error which as shown above would lead to upward biased estimates. A further reason is that the output in certain sectors (nace 75, 80, 85, 90, 91) is produced to a signi…cant extent by non-market producers (i.e. government or other non-pro…t sector …rms). Therefore, estimates of the markup for those sectors might not be always meaningful. This is compounded with the fact that the fraction of non-market producers in these sectors will di¤er a lot across countries, which makes cross-country comparison di¢ cult. Furthermore, in some of these sectors, due to the absence of true markets, output series might be constructed using inputs, at least partially (e.g. in the Public administration & Defence, Compulsory Social Security sector and Health and social Work sector). Given these issues, we do not take into account non-market services when calculating aggregate country mark-ups. We do, however, provide the markup estimates of the individual non-market services sectors in the tables in the appendix. A special note should be made for Real Estate Activities (sector 70). This sector appears as an outlier with a markup ratio of 4.33 in the Euro area and 3.77 in the US. We think that this is possibly due to statistical speci…cities leading to large measurement errors. First, the sector does not only include the services produced by rented dwellings, but also those provided by owneroccupied dwellings. Owner-occupied rent is an imputed output, also likely measured with measurement error leading to upward bias of the markup. Since the percentage of owner-occupied dwellings in di¤erent countries varies, this also leads to di¢ culties in comparing countries. Further, measurement problems in the growth rate of capital costs are likely more important for this sector, for the reason that it has one of the lowest labour and material input share, so that even small errors in capital costs would lead to large biases (as shown in equation 12). 4 Therefore, sector 70 is also excluded from the calculations of aggregate country mark-ups along with non-market services.
Stylized Fact 1: Perfect competition is widely rejected A …rst stylized fact that can be derived is that perfect competition is widely rejected. Across all sectors in all countries markup-ratios are generally statistically signi…cantly larger than 1. There are only a few sectors in which perfect competition cannot be rejected. Stylized Fact 3:Markups are heterogenous across sectors, with services having on average higher markups than manufacturing Table A1 in the appendix further illustrates that markups di¤er widely across industries with some industries systematically having higher markup ratios than other industries across all countries. Speci…cally, industries where monopolies or quasi monopolies or strong network e¤ects play a role seem to have higher markups. For example, the average Euro area markup for Post and Telecommunications is 1.48. This markup, estimated over the period 1981-2004, will not re ‡ect very recent deregulation in that industry. In the US, where telecommunications have been deregulated earlier, the respective markup remains high, lower though than in the Euro area at 1.38. In manufacturing, the two industries with the highest markup are the Tobacco industry and the Electricity and Gas industry, and this in both the Euro area and the US. Clearly, the (quasi) monopolies in the overall energy sector has drawn a lot of (warranted) attention of the regulators.
The highest markups in the Euro area (all higher than 1. Interestingly, markup ratios are on average higher in services industries than manufacturing industries. This is true for all individual countries. This is not surprising as manufacturing is likely to be exposed to more (international) competition than services. The average markup in manufacturing and construction in the Euro area is 1.18, whereas it is 1.56 in market services. For the US the markups are 1.28 in manufacturing versus 1.36 in market services. The di¤erence between manufacturing and market services sectors is larger in the Euro area (0.38) than the US (0.08). This is further illustrated in Figure A1 in the Appendix. In Figure A1 , sectors in the Euro area and the US are sorted by magnitude of the markup, from smallest (left) to largest (right). Evidently, many more services sectors end up at the right in the Euro area than in the US. The dichotomy manufacturing versus services is therefore larger in the Euro area than in the US.
Averages, of course, hide di¤erences at the country-sector level. An interesting example is the Retail Trade sector. Observers traditionally describe the US retail trade to be much more competitive than the average Euro area,
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with the exception of Germany where the retail trade is traditionally seen to be very competitive (Other evidence of that is that the US giant Walmart had to withdraw from the German market after many years of losses. It had trouble competing with the German deep discounters as Aldi, Penny and Lidl (Knorr and Arndt, 2003) ). This story is clearly born out in the data as well. The markup ratio in retail for the US is 1.19, where it is 1.42 in the Euro area. The respective German markup is below the US one at 1.12. The highest markup is found in Italy, a country with traditionally many small local shops, at 1.95.
Stylized Fact 4: Services sectors generally have larger markups in the Euro area than in the US, whereas manufacturing sectors generally have lower markups in the Euro area than in the US.
Comparing the Euro area with the US, sector by sector, reveals that Euro area services generally have higher markups than US services, whereas the pattern is reversed for the manufacturing sector. This is clearly demonstrated in Figure A2 , where markups of individual services and manufacturing industries in the Euro area (vertical axis) are plotted against those of the US (horizontal axis). As is evident from the …gure, service industries are generally above the 45 degree line, indicating higher markups in the Euro area than in the US. Manufacturing industries are generally below the 45 degree line, indicating lower markups in the Euro area than the US. Notably, the di¤erence in the manufacturing sectors between the euro are and the US is less marked than in the services sectors. Services sectors that have especially higher markups in the Euro area than in the US are: Other Water Transport; Other Air Transport; Real Estate Activities; R&D; Sewage & Refusal Disposal, Sanitation and Similar Activities; and Other Service Activities. , we split the sample in two periods (1981-1992 and 1993-2004) . As both the STAN database by the OECD and the EUKLEMS database are ultimately derived from the same national accounts data, one would expect similar estimates for the eighties. And indeed this is the case. Our estimated markups for the eighties for all Euro area countries are rather close to the ones by Oliveira Martins et al (1996) . The average absolute di¤erence is 0.03.
. Austria where markups have risen from 1.14 to 1.30. Folk wisdom has it that the competitive forces of globalization have led to a widescale increase in competition in many sectors across the globe. If this is true, increased competition should show up as a decrease in markups over the period. Again, averages can mask di¤erences at the sectoral level. Therefore, we perform a test of signi…cant di¤erence between the markups of the two periods 1981-1992 and 1993-2004 on each pair of sector-country estimates. The estimated markups for all sectors for both sub-periods are provided in the appendix in Tables A3 and A4 , while the di¤erence of the markups that are signi…cantly lower or higher in the second period is provided in Tabled A5. Table 3 below o¤ers a summary of these results. It is clear that there are no industries that consistently see a change in markup across the countries. If globalization works to change mark-ups this is likely country and sector-speci…c.
In the majority of sectors, markups are not signi…cantly di¤erent in the two sub-periods. Also, there is no clear direction of markup changes either up or down in the Euro area: 45 sectors saw signi…cantly lower markups and 49 signi…cantly higher markups in the second period.
. 
Conclusion
The estimates of markups in the paper support the claim that prices generally exceed marginal cost in the Euro area and the US. Markups are generally higher in services than manufacturing and some countries, notably Italy, show generally higher markups. They also reveal that markups are on average not that di¤erent in the Euro area than in the US. However, the average masks large di¤erences that occur at the sector level. While in manufacturing the Euro area has the lower markups, in services the US has the lower markups. The derivation of equations 1 and 2 for a production function with capital and labour can be found respectively in Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) . For convenience we give a sketch of the proof for our equations 1 and 2 including intermediate inputs.
Derivation of equation 1
Consider the production function under the assumption of Hicks neutral technological change:
Di¤erentiate the production function totally with respect to time (using notation X = 
Assume pro…t maximization under imperfect competition (and price taking on input markets).
The FOCs of this problem can be written as: ; and so on. Plug these FOCs into the di¤erentiated production function above. One gets: 
One gets:
Assume now CRS, this implies that by homogeneity of degree one:
Note that together with the assumptions above (i.e. using the FOCs above and summing them), this implies that: 
Derivation of equation 2
Start with a cost function for a CRS production technology in N t ; K t ; M t :
G(w t ; r t ; m t ) Qt A t = C(w t ; r t ; m t ; Q t ; A t )
Marginal cost, M C t , is de…ned as
Take logs of the above equation and di¤erentiate totally w.r.t. time:
Now use Shepard's lemma for cost functions: i.e @C(wt;rt;mt;Qt;At) @wt = N t and so on, so that:
Plugging this in the above we get:
Using the cost function C t = G t Qt At and C t = w t N t + r t K t + w t M t one can write this as: 
where C is the cost function. It follows that:
with t de…ned as above. Note that the rate of change of prices is identical to the rate of change of marginal cost if one assumes that t is constant over time; that is if
is not a function of t.
By cost minimization and CRS we have that:
So now we take again the above equation and plug in t C t = p t Q t and p t = M C t and use Jt (J = N; K; M ) the input shares in revenue. One then obtains equation (2) in the text. 
